

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO	X			
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OIL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	C/SECOM		X		
20	ES		X		
21			X		
22					
SUSPENSE		14 September Date			

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Remarks

25X1

Executive Registry

84 - 8073

6 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Sensitive Reporting

1. Will you have a set of proposed arrangements drawn up to tighten up severely our source-sensitive HUMINT reports--taking whatever steps are available to reduce the risk of dissemination. This will include restricted dissemination and circulation, handcarrying by courier, no copies left behind, creation of a small group of security officers with responsibilities to:

- arrange for physical handling or delivery of the information;
- coordinate a customer list with the originator;
- maintain a record of who saw what, when;
- develop a set of rules for use of the information, including perhaps some reporting of those to whom it has been made available.

2. For the longer term, I'd like your reaction on the feasibility of developing a computer-based system through which we would disseminate selected products. We would control and manage the system. This would allow us to provide (and control) access to selected current intelligence product from Headquarters. A dedicated mini-computer, serving a limited number of senior customers, could be used to deliver spot reports and other products as appropriate. The system should be designed to eliminate the use of hard copy documents, access would be by password, people would only be sent products for which they were cleared, and a permanent "auditable" record of everyone having access to certain kinds of information would automatically be maintained.

3. In making these suggestions, I have in mind reports of the blue border category, other compartmented HUMINT, and certain other reports just because of their current interest and political sensitivity which might be considered leak prone and at the same time dangerous to sources. In addition to protecting sources and methods, I would look to such an initiative to regenerate the political will to deal with the hard problem of controlling leaks by starting with a small (albeit important) group of customers, and by focusing on clearly sensitive intelligence from a "sources and methods" point of view.

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4. We should be thinking of doing this on a scale which will deal with the most dangerous risk to our sources and methods, and be small enough to be readily workable and susceptible to expansion on the basis of experience. To help judge this, it will be helpful to get your estimate of the number of reports, sources, and customers who might be brought into the operation of such a system, looking for the highest risk and the most narrow audience at the start.



William J. Casey